Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies

You shall provide yourselves with places to serve you as cities of refuge to which a manslayer who has killed a person unintentionally may flee. The cities shall serve you as a refuge from the avenger, so that the manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the assembly… The blood-avenger himself shall put the murderer to death; it is he who shall put him to death upon encounter…But if he pushed him without malice aforethought or hurled any object at him unintentionally, or inadvertently dropped upon him any deadly object of stone, and death resulted — though he was not an enemy of his and did not seek his harm — in such cases the assembly shall decide between the slayer and the blood-avenger. The assembly shall protect the manslayer from the blood-avenger, and the assembly shall restore him to the city of refuge to which he fled, and there he shall remain until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the sacred oil. (Numbers 35:11-25)

It is often argued that the cities of refuge were intended as a counterbalance to a primitive custom of blood vengeance that was incompatible with the development of civilized society. In the absence of any real possibility of eradicating the established custom, the Torah sought to institutionalize and limit the undesirable practice. Thus, for example, Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim Cohn explained:

…the restrictions of the avenger’s rights and their legal regulation mark the beginnings of a system of criminal law…It may be considered a concession to human nature that avenging was not wholly prohibited, but only restricted and regulated: the natural “hot anger” (Deut. 19:6) of the victim’s next of kin is left at least some legal outlet (Haim H. Cohn, “Blood Avenger,” Encyclopedia Judaica).

As opposed to that approach, which views the laws of blood redemption as a compromise, the Talmud defines the act of blood redemption as a mitzvah:

And what is the reference to the “avenger of blood”? — It has been taught: The avenger of blood shall himself put the murderer to death; it is the duty of the avenger of blood. And whence do we know that if he has no avenger of blood the Court must appoint one? From the verse, “When he meets him”, i.e., in all cases (Sanhedrin 45b).

This approach is given normative expression by Maimonides:

It is the duty of the blood redeemer, as it says: “The blood-avenger himself shall put the murderer to death,” and any legal heir is a blood redeemer. If the blood redeemer does not want or is unable to kill him, or if there be no blood redeemer, the Court executes the murderer by the sword (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotzeah, 1:2).

Rabbi Hillel Millgram provides us with an historical perspective in his discussion of the subject of the redeemer in the Book of Ruth:

The institution of the Redeemer of the Blood was vital in that period. In an age in which there was no central authority, no organized police forces and no network of impartial criminal courts, one’s only protection was one’s family. The institution of the Redeemer of the Blood was meant to deter would-be killers by guaranteeing that they would be hunted down and killed by their victim’s relatives. This was one of the most powerful deterrents to the committing of murder (Hillel I. Millgram, Four Biblical Heroines and the Case for Female Authorship, 20).

In a footnote, Millgram adds:

In later year under the monarchy, when police and a court system did exist and where the institution had not died out, the Redeemer of the Blood was considered by the government an arm of the state, and his killing a legal execution in lieu of state action.

It would appear that historical research may aid our understanding of how a particular institution may appear desirable – a duty or mitzvah – in one era, be deemed a “lesser evil” that must be controlled and regulated in another era, and in changed circumstances come to be judged a negative phenomenon that must be eradicated.

1. What other biblical institutions evolved, died out or were eliminated as the result of historical change?

2. How did the ides of establishing cities of refuge contribute to changing the institution of blood redemption?

3. Does the Torah limit blood redemption by any other means?

4. Is Justice Cohn correct in his assessment of blood redemption as a compromise between the real and the ideal, or did the Torah and the sages actually consider blood redemption to be a desirable social phenomenon?

5. The Torah speaks of “a manslayer who has killed a person unintentionally.” Why should such a person be deemed a “murderer” whose life is forfeit to the Redeemer?

6. The Mishnah states: “If a man threw a stone into the public domain and killed [another], he is exiled. R. Eliezer b. Jacob says: If after the stone had left his hand the other put out his head and was hit by the stone, he is not culpable. If he threw the stone into his own courtyard and killed another, if the injured person had the right to enter there, he is exiled; but if not, he is not exiled” (Makkoth 2:2). What moral distinction does the Mishnah make between an unintentional killer who is exiled to the city of refuge and an unintentional killer who is not culpable?